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revolution dealt "policy advocates" a stronger hand than the "promoters of mutual understanding," thereby allowing the move of the USG's public diplomacy functions to the State Department. I will also ask, three years after the fact, if integration was the right thing to do.
The Age-Old Debate
Why was USIA created in the first place? One would think that all diplomacy functions, including "public diplomacy," would naturally be the purview of the State Department. Indeed, the existence of USIA, along with the administration of its public diplomacy functions, has been the subject of almost constant debate since the Agency's inception in 1953 to its end in 1999.
As a practitioner of public diplomacy, I would argue the debate centered on credibility. To understand why credibility is so important, one must be familiar with the several functions of public diplomacy. The 1975 Stanton Report, officially titled "International Information, Education and Cultural Relations: Recommendations for the Future," 2 identified four principal public diplomacy functions. The functions follow:
1. Exchange of Persons-These programs, both educational and cultural, support the ultimate goals of US policy by promoting the exposure of Americans and peoples of nationalities and cultures to each other. Their objectives are thus to build mutual understanding in areas most important to preserving friendly and peaceful US relations worldwide and to help develop a reservoir of people who can exchange ideas easily, can identify common objectives, and can work together to achieve these objectives… 2. General Information-This function involves the dissemination overseas of general information about American society and American perceptions of world affairs rather than specific information about US foreign policy… The purpose is to support foreign policy, by building the context within which policy is understandable and by creating a favorable image of the US overseas which will help it be successful… 3. Policy Information-This function includes the official articulation and explanation of US foreign policy overseas; it is the presentation of the US Government stance on foreign policy questions of immediate concern; indeed, it is policy to those who hear it and do not experience it directly… 4. Advisory-This function involves making available to decision makers, for their consideration in the policy formulation process, information on the state of foreign public opinion and predictive analyses as the effects upon such opinion of potential policy decisions… 3
The Stanton report notes that the first two functions perform a support role that is somewhat removed from day-to-day policy concerns, whereas the latter two functions have an extremely close relationship with the formulation and execution of foreign policy. 4 The first two functions, exchange and information programs, exemplify
American idealism in our foreign policy and are long-term oriented. With these programs, we are confident that American exceptionalism and the strength of our cherished American ideals and values will triumph on their merits (without embellishment) and that seeds sown today will reap sweet fruit in the future. The latter two functions, policy advocacy and providing public affairs advice, demonstrate realism in our foreign policy and the need to act immediately. Here, we know that we must craft our message carefully and trumpet it loudly and quickly because our opponent will do the same. Therein lays the "credibility" debate.
Generally, the first two functions promote mutual understanding between the United States and a foreign country. The audiences and consumers of these services are students, cultural elites, journalists, researchers, opinion shapers, and, in some cases, the general public. The rationale was that only by maintaining a distance and independence from the State Department could the USG's mutual understanding programs be implemented credibly, and thus effectively.
Articulating and delivering our foreign policy message, as well as offering advice on the public affairs impact of our policy, also requires credibility. To the consumers of this message, mostly foreign journalists, academics and decision-makers, credibility comes from knowing the message is accurate and timely, which happens only if the deliverer of the message (generally the press attaché) is plugged into the policy process and has access to the people who made the policy and is involved in crafting the message.
If the messenger sits on the sidelines (by intent or neglect), the savvy consumer will quickly realize this and do an end run around the messenger to a more credible source such as the political attaché or Deputy Chief of Mission. Credibility is equally important within the bureaucracy. For his colleagues to solicit and accept advice on the public affairs impact of a foreign policy, the public affairs advisor must first be invited to the table to participate in the discussion and then be viewed as "on board" with the policy (and not perceived as "letting every flower bloom," which is what he may be doing when wearing his mutual understanding hat). For the public diplomacy officer charged with policy advocacy functions, being housed in USIA provided a huge challenge. Often, the physical and mental distance between the State Department and USIA was immense.
Because of this challenge, many of USIA's press and policy officers always felt that they would be far more effective (and better off professionally) in the State Department. The debate had been on-going since USIA's inception in 1953!
In 1992, the case for an independent public diplomacy agency still held sway over placing the Government's public diplomacy functions in the State Department. Although not robust, the Agency's budget was adequate -enough to sustain its mission. The Cold War was over, but total victory had not been declared. There were still wavering hearts and minds to be won. And finally, the information technology revolution, although just beginning, had not yet exploded. USIS offices overseas were still the major (if not only)
source of information on US foreign policy, American culture and American society in most foreign countries, especially in the developing world. The internet was in its infancy and 24/7 international news coverage had not proliferated. Things began to change rapidly, however, after the election of President Clinton in 1992.
The Road to State
Ironically, with the election of President Clinton, the USIA rank-and-file was hopeful about the future of the agency. It was generally thought that Clinton, an international exchange alumnus and protégé of Senator Fulbright, understood the value of people-to-people exchange and appreciated (and would support) the Agency's mutual understanding programs. In addition, although many were disappointed that a high profile name such as David Gergen was not appointed to lead USIA, the nomination of 9 Some proposals called for dividing the functions between the State Department and USIA. Another recommendation proposed placing the cultural and exchange functions in the Smithsonian, while moving policy advocacy and information functions to State. There were many recipes over the years. Ambassador receive a cable first and then meet with his country team to decide how best to disseminate the information in his host country. When bombs are dropped on Kabul, it is reported in real time on 24/7 CNN and the local press calls immediately for reaction.
No longer does the press attaché have the luxury of waiting until the next day's news cycle to respond. And, when the President gives a speech at the UN, the foreign journalist retrieves the text from the internet. No longer does he wait for the Embassy to send him the transcript in the Wireless File. The IT revolution made it absolutely necessary for the press and policy folks to sing from the same sheet of music-right now! "Everyone realized that we needed to speak with one voice in this new globalized world," said one senior USIA official. The need for closer cooperation and coordination between press and policy officers elevated the relative importance of the policy advocate functions and in turn, significantly bolstered the argument for integration of public diplomacy functions into the State Department.
19 Ironically, the IT revolution also simultaneously weakened the standing of USIA's mutual understanding programs. With the long budget knives out in the mid-90's, one frequently heard these questions: Why should we spend money on cultural programming when American culture is everywhere?; Why should we spend money on exchange programs when it is so easy to travel and study in the United States without government help?; Why do we have libraries overseas when everyone can get any information they want on the internet? Although no one really thought mutual understanding programs were bad, many just did not think they were affordable anymore.
In summary, I argue that four factors converged in the mid-1990's to spell the end of USIA. Severe budget cuts diminished an already small agency's viability. An All of the US Government's public diplomacy functions were transferred to the State Department.
Was It the Right Thing to Do?
Was it the right thing to do? It is an appropriate question to ask now after more than three years of integration and the world-changing events of 9/11. Both of my senior USIA sources said the jury is still out.
21
One source said that public diplomacy officers have never been so engaged in the policy process as they are now. This seems to be true in both Washington and overseas. 22 Thus, from a policy advocacy perspective, the move to State appears to have met expectations and proved to have been the right thing to do.
23
It is in the mutual understanding arena that my USIA colleagues (and I) are not yet convinced that integration has been a success. After the events of 9/11 and with the rise of anti-Americanism around the world, especially in Muslim nations, no one now disputes the importance of mutual understanding programs. Indeed, many lament the budget cuts of years past and are now calling for substantial increases in funding for these Was integration the right thing to do? Yes, but with qualifications. Lidell
Hart wrote that we need strategists to win the war and grand strategists to keep the peace.
On the public diplomacy battlefield, the policy advocates are the strategists and the promoters of mutual understanding are the grand strategists. If the State Department is to effectively conduct public diplomacy in the 21 st Century, we need both.
